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"INTENTION" AS A REQUIREMENT FOR DE
JURE SCHOOL SEGREGATION
In 1954 the United States Supreme Court held that separate but
equal schools were constitutionally prohibited.' From then until 1973,
all of the school desegregation cases decided by the Court involved
state statutes compelling or permitting segregation of public schools
along racial lines. In these "southern" dejure segregation cases, state
action was manifestly present for purposes of invoking the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In 1973 the Court
decided its first "northern" case, Keyes v. School District No. 1,1 in
which no statute wa involved, and defined de jure or actionable
segregation as "a current condition of segregation resulting from
intentional state action."' 3 The Court did not define "intent," how-
ever, and as a result of that omission the lower federal courts are now
in disagreement over the proper interpretation of that word. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, has used an objective
tort standard of reasonably foreseeable consequences to find intent.4
In contrast, a Pennsylvania district court in Husbands v. Pennsyl-
vania' rejected the Second Circuit's standard and held that intent
means subjective.purpose or motive to segregate. This much nar-
rower interpretation of the Keyes "intentional state activity" re-
quirement may have considerable impact on northern plaintiffs. In
fact, it may result in a standard that is nearly impossible for northern
plaintiffs to meet with respect to the quality and quantity of evidence
necessary to sustain their burden of proof.
This Note will analyze the distinction between de jure and de
facto segregation subsequent to the Keyes decision as well as the
rationale of the Husbands decision, especially the manner in which
that court defines the quantum of evidence necessary to support a
finding of intentional dejure segregation under the fourteenth amend-
ment. It will also discuss the disagreement among the lower federal
courts on the proper test to be used in finding intentional state activ-
ity. Finally, it will suggest that the Sixth Circuit's method of combin-
ing a test of reasonably foreseeable consequences-which may result
in a rebuttable presumption of liability-with the available defense
of consistently nondiscriminatory decision making by the defendant
I Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
3 Id. at 205.
Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
395 F. Supp. 1107 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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is the proper one in view of the letter and spirit of the United States
Supreme Court's desegregation cases, both southern and northern.
I. DE JURE AND DE FACTO SEGREGATION: A TRUE DISTINCTION?
In principle, the distinction between dejure and de facto segrega-
tion is readily apparent. The first, as exemplified in its purest form
in the early southern cases,6 results from the application of a state
statute. The second arises from a multitude of factors, none of which
is caused by discriminatory state action. The pure de facto situation,
if it existed, would be analogous to that found at a large cocktail
party where people voluntarily separate into smaller groups accord-
ing to their ages, professions, interests, and perhaps races. Obviously,
in that situation the separate groups do not arise because of discrimi-
natory action by the host or anyone else in a position of authority.
Moreover, the groups are equal and enjoy freedom of movement.
Northern school boards have traditionally contended that their
segregated neighborhood schools developed in precisely this neutral
manner, i.e., in drawing school boundary lines or building new
schools they took the neighborhoods as they found them. The availa-
bility of optional transfer zones7 allegedly ensures freedom of move-
ment for school children. Consequently, the school boards argue, they
are not responsible for, nor do they cause, the school segregation
that often results from a neighborhood school system; thus there is
no state action. The segregation is de facto, and no legal remedy is
available because there is no duty to desegregate when the segrega-
tion results from complex urban human movement over which school
officials have exerted no influence.
The fundamental flaw in the argument of the northern school
boards lies in its disregard for the reciprocal effects of zoning or
building decisions and neighborhood school districting. The building
of a new neighborhood school in the center of a predominantly black
neighborhood will tend to increase the black population of that area.
It will not induce white families to move into that neighborhood;
indeed, it more likely will produce "white flight," if there are any
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. I (1958).
The usual transfer option provision permits any pupil to transfer to a school outside of
his neighborhood school zone if space is available. Plaintiff's expert in Brinkman v. Gilligan,
503 F.2d 684, 696 (6th Cir. 1974), stated that optional transfer zones
create instability in the public . . . in terms of housing choices-and in terms of
perception of whether a school is going black or staying white. . . so that generally
where you have an optional zone which has racial implications, you have an unstable
situation . . . these zones accelerated and precipitated further segregation.
It is self-evident that it would be psychologically easier for a white student to transfer to a
predominantly white school than for a black student to do the same.
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whites to flee. In contrast, a school built on the boundary between
white and black neighborhoods has a chance of remaining integrated.
The neighborhood school defines the neighborhood just as the neigh-
borhood defines the neighborhood school. The Second Circuit Court
of Appeals judicially noted this reciprocal effect in a case in which
the school boards had selected black neighborhoods as suitable areas
in which to locate schools: "Of course the concentration of Negroes
increased in the neighborhood school. Cause and effect came
together."'
In addition, ghetto areas are often bounded by railroad tracks,
rivers, or busy highways. The drawing of school zone boundaries
along those seemingly. neutral boundaries serves to segregate school
populations along racial lines. For example, the Harlem River div-
ided black Harlem from the white Bronx for many years; Cleveland's
Cuyahoga River had a similar effect. Following World War II, the
Chicago and Northwestern Railway above Lake Street marked
the northern tier of the black community in central Chicago. In
Detroit, in the early 1940's, Woodward Avenue divided Negro and
white residential districts.9 These same streets and rivers also make
convenient boundary lines on a school district map.
The concepts of de facto and de jure segregation remain viable,10
although a clear-cut distinction between the two in practice is now
difficult to discern." Justice Powell indicated in his concurring opin-
ion in Keyes that he would have us disregard the distinction entirely.
He stated that the fourteenth amendment gives rise to "the right...
to expect that once the State has assumed responsibility for educa-
tion, local school boards will operate integrated school systems within
their respective districts."1 However, the majority opinion in Keyes
retained the distinction and stated that "the essential elements of de
8 United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 876 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967) (emphasis added).
I D. CLARK, THE GHETTO GAME: RACIAL CONFLICTS IN THE CITY 29-30 (1962). See also
D. MCENTIRE, RESIDENCE AND RACE (1960).
11 However, two significant decisions have refused to acknowledge the distinction. Hobson
v. Hanson, 269 F. Supp. 401, 503-06 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nor. Smuck v. Hobson, 408
F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School Dist., 467 F.2d 142,
148 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 922 (1973).
11 The key issue in breaking down legal distinctions between de jure and de facto
discrimination . . . is the concept of shared liability. De facto discrimination neces-
sarily involves policies and practices of a particular defendant or class of defendants
which reflect the larger society's discrimination. A neutral or even well-intentioned
policy may produce discriminatory results because of prior circumstances beyond the
control of the policymaker.
Kushner and Werner, Metropolitan Desegregation after Milliken v. Bradley: The Case of Land
Use Litigation Strategies, 24 CATH. U.L. REV. 187, 208 (1975).
12 413 U.S. at 225-26 (emphasis in original).
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jure segregation . . . [are] a current condition of segregation result-
ing from intentional state action."'" As a result, between the concep-
tually pristine concepts of de facto and de jure segregation now lies
a perplexing morass created by the Supreme Court's use of the word
"intentional" without further definition.
The distinction between de facto and de jure segregation was
reasonably clear when Brown v. Board of Education was decided in
1954.14 Subsequently, a plaintiff usually could prove a constitutional
violation merely by referring to a state statute on the books in 1954
that required separation of the races.
Thus the bulk of the law during those years dealt with efforts of the
federal trial court, on default of local school authorities, to fashion
effective remedies, and in the process to overcome persistent efforts
at the local level to get around them. 5
In the South the existence of a dual educational system gave rise to
an affirmative duty on the part of school officials to "take whatever
steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which
racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch."'" It has
been suggested that "the development that, more than any other, has
blurred the distinction between dejure and de facto segregation is the
heavy remedial burden the Court has imposed in decisions dealing
with southern school desegregation." 7 The prior existence of a state
statute authorizing segregated schools has been ample evidence of
state action. If such a statute exists, the issue becomes whether or not
the schools are in fact segregated; the school boards process of deci-
sion making is irrelevant.
The line between de facto and de jure segregation began to blur
in a 1961 New York federal district court case, Taylor v. Board of
Education."8 It was held that the gerrymandering of school bounda-
ries with a racially segregative motive was dejure segregation. Taylor
I3 d. at 205.
" See Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis,
60 CALIF. L. REv. 275 (1972).
11 Higgins v. Board of Educ., 395 F. Supp. 444,481 (W.D. Mich. 1973) (emphasis added).
" Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
'7 Goodman, supra note 14, at 285.
" 191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940
(1961). The neighborhood school system was under attack. Plaintiff's evidence established a
rigid adherence to district lines which were established out of a desire to separate whites and
blacks, as well as the Board's refusal to institute any plans for desegregation submitted by
experts, even on an experimental basis. The Taylor court focused on the process of decision
making, accepting that "the issue of intent and purpose is controlling"; however, it looked to
the result of that process for proof of intent: the court "must look through the guise in which
school officials seek to clothe their unconstitutional conduct."
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held further that courts should examine the process of decision mak-
ing and the motives of school board members. If the motives are free
of racial taint, there is no affirmative duty to desegregate; the segre-
gation is de facto. However, if segregation of schools is racially moti-
vated, the same duty arises in the North as in the South to desegre-
gate the schools. In that district, then, a finding of segregative moti-
vation on the part of the school board became the equivalent of a
state statute: both supported a de jure segregation action, and both
raised an affirmative duty to desegregate. However, such a motiva-
tion on the part of school boards is notoriously difficult to prove.
Under this standard, much more would be required of northern plain-
tiffs than the mere production of a segregative statute. Thus a segre-
gated school system might be tolerated in the North in the absence
of proof of segregative motive; it would not be tolerated in the South
where, in most cases, the conclusive statute has been present.
This anomalous result appears to flow from an underlying confu-
sion as to why segregation is constitutionally prohibited. Is it the
segregative statute itself that gives rise to the evil to be corrected? Or
is segregation in and of itself so psychologically and emotionally
harmful that it violates the equal protection clause? The heavy reme-
dial burden the Supreme Court has imposed on the South clearly
implies the latter foundation. However, that foundation is inconsist-
ent with the concept of de facto segregation. Such was the situation
in 1973 when the Supreme Court decided its first "northern" school
desegregation case, Keyes v. School District No. 1.
II. THE Keyes DECISION
The Keyes decision tied the concept of intent to the concept of
de jure segregation. In its discussion of de jure segregation, the Court
directed that the federal courts in subsequent decisions must follow
a two-step analysis: first, a determination of whether a condition of
racial segregation exists; second, a determination of whether that
condition results from intentional state activity.
The Court delineated the factors to be considered in making the
first determination:
What is or is not a segregated school will necessarily depend on the
facts of each case. In addition to the racial and ethnic composition
of a school's body, other factors, such as the racial and ethnic
composition of the faculty and staff and the community and admin-
istration attitudes toward the school, must be taken into considera-
tion."9
" 413 U.S. at 196.
37 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 653 (1976)
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court chose not to expound on the
second step of the analysis-the determination of whether the segre-
gation is a result of intentional state action. It provided no definition
of intent, nor any guidelines to be considered in subsequent determi-
nations of what constitutes intentional action. In Keyes, the Court
was able to avoid the issue because the intent to segregate was clearly
inferable from gerrymandering of attendance zones and other prac-
tices. Perhaps most significantly, the present school board repealed
a resolution to desegregate schools in the area, which resolution had
been passed by the former school board. This was nearly an admis-
sion of segregative motive on the part of the Denver school board.
Accordingly, courts that were to address the issue in later, less clear-
cut cases had little guidance on what would constitute "intentional
state action" in the variety of factual situations to arise."0
The intent issue is further complicated by the holding in Keyes
that
a finding of intentional segregative school board actions in a mean-
ingful portion of a school system . . . establishes. . . a prima facie
case of unlawful segregative design on the part of school authorities,
and shifts to those authorities the burden of proving that other
segregated schools within the system are not also the result of inten-
tionally segregative actions.'
One commentator wrote shortly after the Keyes decision:
Keyes has the potential to sweep through the North overturning
school systems as dramatically as Swann has in the South. Indeed,
the comparison of Swann and Keyes is striking: a system-wide rem-
edy is secured by empirical proof of current racial imbalance (but-
tressed in the North by an easy finding of intent in a meaningful
portion) and justified by a presumption or presumptions. n
Subsequent events have shown that this commentator was overly
optimistic. The lower courts can easily avoid shifting the burden to
the defendant school board by defining intent subjectively, thereby
raising the legal standard a plaintiff must originally meet to an al-
most unreachable level.
It is important to note that the Keyes decision did not itself
21 "This Court, in Brown I, appropriately dealt with the large constitutional principles:
other federal courts had to grapple with the flinty, intractable realities of day-to-day implemen-
tation of those constitutional commands." Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1, 6 (1971).
21 413 U.S. at 208.
2 Comment, Keyes v. School District No. 1: Unlocking the Northern Schoolhouse Doors,
9 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-CIv. LIB. L. Rsv. 124, 151 (1974) (emphasis added).
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precipitate conflicting decisions among the various circuits; it merely
failed to eliminate the source of those conflicts. Prior to Keyes, the
type of evidence necessary to make a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion under the fourteenth amendment had varied considerably in the
North. At one extreme of objectivity, for example, the trial court in
a 1965 Oklahoma decision, took judicial notice of "resistance in all-
white communities to Negroes who seek to obtain housing there," as
well as "the continuing subordinate position Negroes hold on the
economic ladder." 2 The district court found that a neighborhood
school policy, "when superimposed over already existing residential
segregation initiated by law . . . , leads inexorably to continued
school segregation."' . (Residential patterns in that case had been
established by statute and restrictive covenants.) Accordingly, the
court ordered that the board of education "must take clear, affirma-
tive, aggressive action to bring about desegregation. '25
On the other hand, a Kansas case, also decided in 1965, typifies
the subjective end of the spectrum. A school board had changed a
boundary line with the result that blacks affected by the change would
go to a predominantly black school. The school superintendent testi-
fied that the change was made to alleviate overcrowded conditions.
It was held that the issue was one of "good faith intentions of the
school authorities, ' '26 and that the board had no "duty to eliminate
segregation in fact as well as segregation by intention." z
III. LOWER COURT DISAGREEMENT OVER THE PROPER DEFINITION
OF INTENTIONAL STATE ACTIVITY
Several cases with typical fact situations from various circuit
courts of appeals illustrate the differing definitions of intentional
state activity since the Supreme Court's decision in Keyes.
The Second Circuit squarely faced the definitional question in
Hart v. Community School Board of Education." The court ac-
knowledged that the question was not authoritatively settled by
Keyes, but that "[t]he question is simply by what standard state
action is to be judged, whether on the foreseeable consequences of
acts or on an indispensable finding that the act or omission was
21 Dowell v. School Bd., 244 F. Supp. 971, 975 (W.D. Okla. 1965).
24 Id. at 976.
I d. at 982.
Is Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988, 997 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
914 (1965).
" Id. at 998. See also Bell v. School City of Gary, 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd
324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964). The district court stated that
it "cannot presume that the Board acted in bad faith." 213 F. Supp. at 826.
21 412 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
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racially motivated. 12 The court then reasoned that because the latter
standard would be "almost impossible of proof save by admissions,"
the former is more consistent with the shift of the burden of proof
effected in Keyes.3" Consequently, it held that "a finding of de jure
segregation may be based on actions taken, coupled with admissions
made, by governmental authorities which have the natural and fore-
seeable consequences of causing educational segregation."',
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit 2 vacated and remanded a 1971
pre-Keyes district court decision33 which had used the natural and
foreseeable consequence standard while assuming that intent was ir-
relevant. The circuit court gave no direction as to the standard to be
used, however; it merely remanded with direction to try the issue of
intent on the merits. On remand, the trial court was not called upon
to set forth its standard because
the evidence clearly demonstrates the defendant's intent to segre-
gate its elementary schools. Minutes from August 1934 to June
1939-discovered after the Ninth Circuit"s decision in this
case-chronicle the School Board's blatant intent to segregate Ox-
nard's elementary school children. 4
Thus the district court had evidence that amounted to an admission
of purposely maintained dual school systems.
A recent First Circuit decision, while not declaring its standard
as explicitly as the Second Circuit, clearly favored the foreseeable
consequences test .3 The court was faced with the traditional argu-
ment of a school board that it has no duty to take affirmative steps
to eliminate de facto segregation in its schools. The court rejected the
defendants' argument.
Not only is it inconceivable that the repeated rejection of proposals
which would promote desegregation could not properly be consid-
ered by a court as evidence of an intent to create or maintain segre-
gation, but there can be no doubt that defendants' failures to act
are probative evidence of intent . . ..
29 Id. at 49.
30 Id. at 50.
31 Id.
31 Soria v. Oxnard School Dist., 488 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1973).
1 Soria v. Oxnard School Dist., 328 F. Supp. 155 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
3 Soria v. Oxnard School Dist., 386 F. Supp. 539, 540 (C.D. Cal. 1974). The district
court found "deplorable words" in the minutes including the 1936 statement that "the Board
was in favor of the principle of segregation, although it might not be entirely practical at this
time." Id. at 541.
Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974).
3 Id. at 585.
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The court also noted that "every decision to act for racial balance or
to fight it has consequences. '3 7 It can reasonably be inferred from
the court's language that an awareness of segregative consequences
from a failure to act is to be treated as evidence of intentional action
in the First Circuit.
The Fifth Circuit's approach is now similar to that of the First
Circuit." The court has admitted that its earlier "cause and effect"
standard 9 for finding a dual school system, or de jure segregation,
is no longer a proper one after Keyes' requirement of intent. How-
ever, it stated in Morales v. Shannon that the natural and foreseeable
consequences of acts that maintain segregated schools are "strong
evidence of segregatory intent."4 Accordingly, the district court's
finding of no segregative intent in that case was held erroneous. The
act which was ultimately found to be unconstitutional was the imposi-
tion of a neighborhood school assignment system on an area where
Mexican-Americans and Anglos had separate residential patterns.
The Sixth Circuit's definition of intent is perhaps the closest to
that of the Second Circuit. In Oliver v. Board of Education, the court
stated that
a presumption of segregative purpose arises when plaintiffs establish
that the natural, probable, and foreseeable result of public officials'
action or inaction was an increase or perpetuation of public school
segregation.4
The Sixth Circuit, however, permits this presumption to be rebutted
by an affirmative establishment that the defendants' "action or inac-
tion was a consistent and resolute application of racially neutral poli-
cies."42 In other words, the rebuttable presumption shifts the burden
of proof to the defendant who must then prove that the suspect
decision-making process has been racially nondiscriminatory.
Id. at 586.
Morales v. Shannon, 516 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1975).
a, The Fifth Circuit's "cause and effect" standard was presented in Cisneros v. Corpus
Christi Independent School Dist., 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972).
0 516 F.2d at 413.
4' 508 F.2d 178, 182 (6th Cir. 1974).
2 d. at 182. The Sixth Circuit's choice of the word "neutral" was an unfortunate one.
The Keyes decision states that "it is not enough .. that the school authorities rely upon some
allegedly logical, racially neutral explanation for their actions" in discharging their burden
413 U.S. at 210. The Supreme Court, however, later distinguishes a "racially neutral explana-
tion" from practices that were not taken in effectuation of a policy to create or maintain
segregation or "were not factors in causing the existing condition of segregation in these
schools." 413 U.S. at 214. The Court stated that this latterpolicy, which by its terms eliminates
intentional activity, did affirmatively discharge the Board's burden. The Sixth Circuit clearly
refers to this latter policy and not to the former unacceptable explanation or rationalization.
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In Brinkman v. Gilligan," a Dayton, Ohio, desegregation case,
the Sixth Circuit was faced with a factual situation remarkably like
that in Keyes. In Dayton, as in Denver, there were racially imbal-
anced schools, optional attendance zones, and the rescission by the
Dayton school board of three desegregation resolutions passed by
earlier boards. The case was appealed three times, the latter two
appeals going to the issue of sufficiency of remedy. The appellate
court stated simply: "Although the phrase 'de jure' does not appear
in our former opinion, the meaning of that decision is that the Dayton
school system has been and is guilty of de jure segregation prac-
tices."44
A third Sixth Circuit decision, Higgins v. Board of Education,"
strongly implies the use of the foreseeable consequences standard. In
that case the appellate court affirmed a district court decision finding
an absence of segregative intent because "the phenomenal increase
in the black population in Grand Rapids was not clearly foreseeable
until the imbalances were so advanced that a far-reaching reshuffling
would have been required to correct them."" It was also significant
that the Grand Rapids school board did have a desegregation plan
in effect.
In summary, two distinct standards have arisen since Keyes for
raising the presumption of intentional state activity that must accom-
pany a finding of de jure segregation: foreseeable consequences and
racial motivation. In addition, there are two distinct standards for
rebutting that presumption: the Sixth Circuit permits a showing of a
nondiscriminatory decision making policy, while the Second Circuit
requires affirmative desegregative action.
It appears that the professed difficulty in defining "intentional"
state activity is, in reality, the concern of courts over the remedy of
complete desegregation which is generally mandated. This concern
could be partially alleviated by a separation of the issues of causation
and remedy. Clearly, a court will require a higher level of proof of
intent to establish the plaintiff's prima facie case if it is convinced that
a presumption of intentional state activity shifts the burden to the
defendant to prove it took affirmative action to desegregate. In that
situation, the allocation of the burden of proof would appear to be
1 503 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1974).
41 518 F.2d 853, 854 (6th Cir. 1975): The third appeal is Brinkman v. Gilligan, No. 76-
1854 (6th Cir. filed July 26, 1976).
508 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 790 (emphasis added). The Higgins case raises another disputed issue: whether
the school board may take the prospect of "white flight" into account during its decision-
making process.
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dispositive as in the South and in the Second Circuit. If, however, the
Sixth Circuit's approach is followed, the burden of proof that shifts
to the defendant can be met by proof of a racially nondiscriminatory
policy. Thus the plaintiff, to establish his prima facie case, must prove
that a reasonable school board member could have foreseen the seg-
regative results of a specific action. The defendants then have the
burden of proving the resolutely nondiscriminatory character of their
decision-making process. The shift of the burden of proof is therefore
less likely to be dispositive.
IV. Husbands v. Pennsylvania
The factual pattern of Husbands is a typical one. Delaware
County, Pennsylvania, had a nonwhite population of about seven per
cent. However, two of the county's fifteen school districts, Chester
City and Chester Township, had 67.9 percent and 62.1 percent black
student bodies, respectively. The great majority of the county's black
children received their education from these two school districts.47
The county school district's 1968 reorganization plan, which pre-
sented the issue of de jure segregation in Husbands, merged the two
predominantly black school districts." The less than startling result:
a single unit, Unit 12, with a black school population that had in-
creased by 1972 to seventy-one percent of the total number of pupils.
Moreover, four other units with black populations ranging from zero
to eight percent abutted Unit 12.11
Other aspects of the Chester City area set forth by the district
court were also unhappily familiar: low average family income, a low
median value of housing units, a high percentage of families on public
assistance, and so forth."0 In other words, Delaware County presented
the American racial paradigm: a poor black school district sur-
rounded by more affluent white districts, and a decision5' by the
school board to maintain the status quo.52
11 395 F. Supp. 1107, 1116-17 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
14 Reorganization was mandated by the Act of July 8, 1968, No. 150, [1968] Pa. Laws
299 (codified at 24 PA. STAT. § 2400 et seq. (Supp. 1974)). 395 F. Supp. at 1114.
" 395 F. Supp. at 1119.
I d. at 1122-23.
Mr. Clyde Dalton, Executive Director of the Delaware County Intermediate Unit,
testified that the County Board did not seriously consider the merging of the City of Chester
with any of the larger contiguous school districts because "there was no need here to be serving
the City of Chester by enlarging it with a large district. The need was to help [to increase the
tax base of] the other districts that were adjacent to Chester." Brief for Plaintiff at 9.
1 A decision to maintain the status quo is virtually impossible in a racially paranoid
society. At best, white movement into the area halts; at worst, white movement away from the
area precipitates. From 1968 to 1972 the Chester City black population rose from sixty-four
percent to seventy-two percent. 395 F. Supp. at 1117.
37 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 653 (1976)
The Chester City area of Delaware County is paradigmatic in
more ways than its racial makeup. Racial problems had surfaced in
Chester in 1963 when black residents began demonstrating against
their segregated schools. The school board denied any responsibility,
claiming that the segregation had resulted from residential patterns
over which it had no control.53 In April, 1964, the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Commission (PHRC) intervened and, after hear-
ings, found that segregated schools were being maintained, that
school zones confined black children to black schools, and that no
affirmative plans were being accepted or implemented by the board
which would effectively desegregate the schools.54
The Husbands court found that Unit 12 presented a segregated
condition," the first of two requirements for actionable segregation.
Also, the court found that "the state action which brought the unit
into existence [the reorganization plan] created or contributed to its
having the segregation it contained,"56 and that the school boards had
been aware of the racial consequences of their actions. Although the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals had never set forth a standard by
which to decide whether segregative intent exists, the Husbands court
had before it the Second Circuit's decision holding that intent under
Keyes requires a showing of "actions taken, coupled with omissions
made, by governmental authorities which have the natural and fore-
seeable consequences of causing educational segregation." 58 The facts
of Husbands clearly met the standard adopted by the Second Circuit.
However, the district court specifically rejected the "natural and fore-
seeable consequences" test, holding that subjective purpose to dis-
criminate is the standard of intent under Keyes.5
The Husbands court did not stop here, but continued its analysis
by interpreting the holding in Keyes that
a finding of intentionally segregative school board actions in a
meaningful portion of a school system . . . . established . . . a
prima facie case of unlawful segregation design on the part of school
authorities, and shifts to those authorities the burden ofproving that
Human Relations Comm'n v. Chester, 427 Pa. 157, 233 A.2d 290, 292 (1967). The
six schools in question ranged from 87 percent to 100 percent. 427 Pa. at 178, 233 A.2d at
301.
Id. at 162, 233 A.2d at 293.
395 F. Supp. at 1137.
' Id. at 1139.
Id. at 1141.
" Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d at 50.
' 395 F. Supp. at 1132, 1133. Dictum in Washington v. Davis, 44 U.S.L.W. 4789 (1976),
indicates the agreement of Mr. Justice White with this aspect of the Husbands opinion.
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other segregated schools within the system are not also the result
of intentionally segregative action."
The Husbands court carefully defined what it understood Keyes
to mean by "prima facie case":
[T]he plaintiff's evidence not only compels defendant to produce
evidence on the issue in question, but also shifts the burden of proof
to the defendant on this issue. In other words, the plaintiffs evi-
dence establishes a presumption in favor of his contention on the
issue, and shifts the risk of non-persuasion on the issue to the defen-
dant."
The Husbands court did recognize that the presumption created
by the Keyes rule, and the underlying rationale of this rule, are not
necessarily limited to the situation in which the prima facie case of
intent is established by a showing of subjective intent in a small part
of the school district. The court stated that "[g]iven the facts of
Keyes,"-that subjective intent was clearly present as to the small
area-
this holding is clear enough, but the rationale on which the Court
reached this conclusion and holding is less clear. The above-quoted
language lends itself to two different interpretations of the Court's
rationale.
The first is that the burden of proof shifted because of the
special probative value, insofar as the issue of segregation in part
of a school system is concerned, of a finding of intentional segrega-
tion in another, significant part of that system. In effect, this ration-
ale would shift the burden of proof only in cases where such a
finding had occurred concerning a significant part or all of the
school system in question.
The second interpretation of the Court's rationale, however, is
that the burden shifted because the finding of intentional segrega-
tion in one substantial part of the system established a prima facie
case as to whether intent underlay segregation in any other part of
that same system. Under this interpretation, the emphasis falls upon
the concept of a prima facie case, rather than the particular means
by which it is established in a given case. While a finding of inten-
tional segregation in another part of the system in question is one
way to establish such a case, it is not necessarily the only way. Such
rationale would dictate that regardless of the means of evidence by
which a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, once he has estab-
lished such case the burden of proof shifts as readily as it did in
Keyes."
413 U.S. at 208 (emphasis added).
': 395 F. Supp. at 1139.
62 Id. at 1135-36.
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It clearly makes good policy sense to accept the second, broader
interpretation of the Keyes presumption rule. When the plaintiffs
have shown strong, albeit circumstantial, evidence of motivation, the
burden of proof should shift, since the school board has access to the
reasons for its actions, and plaintiffs usually do not have this ac-
cess.63
However, the Husbands court chose not to resolve the issue of
whether a prima facie case could be established in more than one
manner; rather, the court accepted arguendo the more expansive view
of how to trigger the Keyes presumption, and proceeded to consider
the issue of whether the plaintiffs had indeed presented a prima facie
case on the issue of intent. 4
The Husbands court then reasoned that intent meant subjective
purpose or motive; that the plaintiffs had submitted no "direct evi-
dence of segregative intent, and only circumstantial evidence of a
limited extent"; 5 and that, therefore, the plaintiff's evidence did not
constitute even a prima facie case of intent to segregate the black
students in Unit 12. However, this analysis is logically unsound. If,
as assumed by the court, a prima facie case can be established by
evidence of a different type than that of subjective intent concerning
a small area, then it makes no sense to require the plaintiff to prove
subjective intent as part of this prima facie case, since this is precisely
the burden which is placed on the defendant through the effect of the
presumption. The Keyes presumption rule becomes meaningless
under this analysis.
However, the Husbands court did retract from this position to
some extent. The court stated that the primary reason for its refusal
to find a prima facie case here was not the lack of evidence on
subjective intent:
Our principal hesitation against holding that plaintiffs' evidence
established a prima facie case on intent stems from the complete
absence of any evidence whatsoever of the feasibility of alternative
reorganization plans for the component districts of Unit 12.11
The court quickly noted that the plaintiffs need not treat the feasibil-
ity issue exhaustively; it recognized that the board has better access
3 The burden of proof of intent in a civil action such as this should be distinguished from
a criminal proceeding, in which proof of a mental element is placed on the government for
important policy reasons absent here. Furthermore, such general presumptions on the issue of
intent have been created in several types of civil actions against the government under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981 and 1983. See 395 F. Supp. at 1136-1137.
' 395 F. Supp. at 1137.
Id. at 1140.
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to the facts. Indeed, the court stated that, "we would perhaps hold,
for example, that once plaintiff produces some evidence on the feasi-
bility issue, the burden of proof on such issue falls to the defendant."67
It is difficult to see the logic behind the district court's line
drawing. The decision to make the showing of feasible alternative
plans a required part of a plaintiff's prima facie case rather than an
element of a defendant's defense after the burden has shifted seems
an arbitrary one. Because of its decision that the plaintiffs had not
established a prima facie case, the Husbands court did not have to
confront the issue of what standard of proof a defendant must meet
to carry its burden: whether or not evidence of neutral decision mak-
ing is sufficient. It is clear, however, that the Husbands court felt that
the assignment of the burden of persuasion would be dispositive in a
desegregation case such as that one. In addition, evidence of feasible
alternative plans does not necessarily seem to be any more "direct"
proof of segregative purpose or motive than the mass of other evi-
dence that was submitted by the Husbands plaintiffs. As the plaintiffs
argued in their brief, "[i]t is only common sense that under Act 150,
since reorganization was limited to contiguous school districts, that
if, for example, Chester Township was not placed in the Chester-
Upland School District, then it would have had to be placed in some
other contiguous school district."8 Thus an alternative was in fact
offered. Furthermore, the 1968 desegregation directive issued by the
PHRC, the mass of statistics showing a history of segregation, and
an increase in segregation following the reorganization added to the
plaintiff's proof. Given the typical lack of access to evidence of moti-
vation on the part of the plaintiffs, it is indeed difficult to conceive
of any proof of intent other than that which is circumstantial when
intent is equated with motive rather than with foreseeable conse-
quences.
One of the assumptions on which the Second Circuit based its
decision on the proper standard in Hart v. Community School Board
of Education was the difficulty of proof under the motive or pur-
pose standard, since to require a finding of purpose or motivation
would be to establish a standard "almost impossible of proof save by
admission."'" Judge Newcomer of the Husbands court disagreed and
pointed out in his opinion that "[ilntent, even in the sense of purpose
or motive, may readily be inferred in the proper circumstances
'M-0 In addition, he noted that Keyes requires only a showing
I d.at 1142.
" Supplemental Brief for Plaintiff at 5.6.
512 F.2d 37, 50 (2d Cir. 1975).
70 395 F. Supp. at 1134.
37 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 653 (1976)
that segregative intent or purpose is one, not necessarily the dominant
or only, factor.7' One wonders, however, what the "proper circum-
stances" will be in the more difficult cases of the future.
V. CONCLUSION
In the two decades that have passed since the Supreme Court
first held that separate but equal schools were constitutionally pro-
hibited, the Court has made it clear that nothing short of aggressive
affirmative action on the part of southern school officials to eliminate
all vestiges of segregation from their school systems is acceptable.
Nearly twenty years after Brown, however, the Court heard its first
northern desegregation case and held that the de facto-dejure distinc-
tion remains valid for the North. The Court decided in Keyes that
intentional state action must be present to justify a finding of de jure
segregation, and also arguably concluded that once a prima facie case
of intentional state action has been established the burden shifts to
school officials to show the economic or other proper bases for their
actions.
Since 1973, the lower courts have differed in their interpretations
of the quantum and type of evidence necessary to prove intent under
Keyes. Two standards are currently employed to determine in-
tent-the tort standard of foreseeable consequences and the motive
or bad faith standard. The latter is notoriously difficult to meet, since
it requires evidence on the level of admissions. Moreover, it gives rise
to conflicting decisions flowing from fundamentally similar factual
patterns depending on whether "proper circumstances" are present.
In addition, this motive test creates disparate standards for the North
and South. In contrast, the foreseeable consequences test permits an
accumulation of circumstantial evidence to prove segregative intent.
This test is particularly appropriate where, as in the Sixth Circuit, a
showing of intentional state action is not conclusive, but merely shifts
the burden to the school board to justify its actions as racially nondis-
criminatory. This is when the good faith of the defendant school
board logically ought to be determined, and the burden naturally
ought to be on the school board because of its access to records of
its decision-making process.
If, however, intent is equated with motive and proof of bad faith
is a necessary part of a plaintiff's prima facie case, the shift of the
burden to the school board to prove affirmative action to desegregate
is unlikely to occur. Such is the unfortunate effect of the interpreta-
7' Id. at 1134.
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tion which the Pennsylvania district court applied in Husbands v.
Pennsylvania. Although several Circuit Courts of Appeals have de-
vised varied but workable interpretations of this element of Keyes,
the Third Circuit has not. It is submitted that the Third Circuit
should avoid future rulings such as Husbands by adopting a tempered
standard similar to that employed in school desegregation cases by
the Sixth Circuit.
Roberta Y. Bavry
